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MCCULLOCH V. MADISON: JOHN MARSHALL’S
EFFORT TO BURY MADISONIAN FEDERALISM
Kurt Lash*
In his engaging and provocative new book, The Spirit of the
Constitution: John Marshall and the 200-Year Odyssey of
McCulloch v. Maryland, David S. Schwartz challenges McCulloch’s canonical status as a foundation stone in the building of
American constitutional law. According to Schwartz, the fortunes of McCulloch ebbed and flowed depending on the politics
of the day and the ideological commitments of Supreme Court
justices. Judicial reliance on the case might disappear for a generation only to suddenly reappear in the next. If McCulloch v.
Maryland enjoys pride of place in contemporary courses on constitutional law, Schwartz argues, then this is due more to personalities and institutions of the early twentieth century than it is to
any deeply rooted historical consensus about the importance of
Marshall’s opinion. Nor, Schwartz insists, should we read Marshall’s opinion on the Second Bank of the United States as embracing a theory of “aggressive nationalism” and the unlimited
expansion of implied congressional power. That might be a correct reading of the Constitution (Schwartz is never completely
clear on this particular point), but Marshall himself muddied the
issue with ambiguous language—language that left the door open
to later more restrictive interpretations of federal power. The fact
that scholars and judges continue to treat McCulloch as a foundational statement of constitutional power reflects a triumph of
twentieth century mythology—a triumph triply problematic in
that it (1) is historically misleading, (2) does not embrace a fully
robust understanding of implied federal power (which Schwartz
presumably prefers), and (3) relies upon the same history-centric
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values as “conservative originalism” (which Schwartz presumably rejects).
In short, Schwartz comes not to praise the mythological
McCulloch, but to bury it. Readers who complete this deep dive
into two hundred years of cultural and judicial references to
McCulloch will probably be persuaded by Schwartz’s general arguments: McColloch does contain ambiguous and at times seemingly contradictory language, Marshall’s opinion has been
viewed in different ways at different times, and it is only recently
that the case has come to occupy its status as a canonical statement of congressional authority. As Bruce Ackerman pointed out
years ago, the New Deal Court embraced John Marshall and
McCulloch in order to add a patina of original understanding to
its startling restructuring of federal power. The New Deal Supreme Court, in other words, made a myth of McCulloch.
But although Schwartz challenges the post-New Deal myth
of McCulloch, his historical account remains substantially bound
to that same myth. McCulloch-as-myth legitimates the modern
Supreme Court’s expansive interpretation of implied federal
power. The myth treats the case as important because of its paragraphs addressing the implied powers of Congress. Schwartz
accepts the myth’s focus on this particular issue even as he challenges its veracity. The historical journey recounted in his book
focuses on the issue of implied federal power: from disputes over
internal improvements and slavery to the modern debates over the
scope of the administrative state. The journey is fascinating, but
this almost single-minded focus on implied power has the effect
of further entrenching the myth’s insistence that McCulloch is important because of its discussion of the Necessary and Proper
Clause. No doubt, this is the central importance of McCulloch
today. But this was not the central importance of Marshall’s opinion in 1819. When John Marshall drafted McCulloch, he had
more on his mind than justifying internal improvements, and
much more than simply validating the existence of the Second
Bank of the United States. McCulloch v. Maryland represents
Marshall’s effort to redefine the nature of the Constitution itself.
It is easy to miss Marshall’s ambitious effort. Indeed, Marshall
likely wanted readers to initially miss the more radical implications of his opinion. He was so successful at masking his goal
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that, to this very day, the most historically significant paragraphs
of the opinion are rarely noticed, much less given the attention
they deserve.
Marshall begins his constitutional analysis in McCulloch by
addressing what he characterizes as an odd and rather unimportant point raised by Maryland’s lawyers:
In discussing this question, the counsel for the state of Maryland have deemed it of some importance, in the construction of the constitution, to consider that instrument, not as
emanating from the people, but as the act of sovereign and
independent states.1

Here, John Marshall feigns ignorance. In fact, Marshall and
every other student of the American Constitution in 1819 knew
exactly why Maryland’s counsel “deemed it of some importance”
to make this particular point about the origins of the Constitution.
If, as Maryland argued, the Constitution “emanated” from the still
sovereign people of the several states, then whatever power those
people delegated away ought to be strictly construed. This was
not just Maryland’s opinion. This was the central interpretive
principle announced in the most influential constitutional treatise
of the day, St. George Tucker’s “View of the Constitution.”2
An influential Virginia judge and a professor of law at the
College of William and Mary, St. George Tucker published “A
View of the Constitution” in 1803. The very first constitutional
treatise, Tucker’s “View” was heavily influenced by the constitutional theories of James Madison and the Federalist Papers. Repeatedly citing Madison’s work, Tucker described the Constitution as a “compact freely, voluntarily, and solemnly entered into
by the several states, and ratified by the people thereof.”3 This
was not the “compact theory” eventually espoused by John C.
Calhoun. Tucker’s theory of the constitutional compact echoed
James Madison’s dual federalism theories declared in the Virginia
1. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 402 (1819).
2. St. George Tucker, View of the Constitution of the United States, in 1
BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND
LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, app. Note D passim (St. George Tucker ed., Lawbook Exch.
1996) (1803).
3. Id. at 155.
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Resolution, Madison’s Report of 1800, and originally introduced
in the Federalist Papers. Quoting Madison’s Federalist 39, for
example, Tucker repeats Madison’s assurance to the ratifiers that
adopting the Constitution would not result in a “consolidated government”:
[A]lthough the constitution would be founded on the assent
and ratification of the people of America, yet that assent and
ratification was to be given by the people, not as individuals
composing one entire nation; but as composing the distinct
and independent states, to which they respectively belong. It
is to be the assent and ratification of the several states, derived from the supreme authority in each state, the authority
of the people themselves. The, act, therefore establishing the
constitution, will not, said they, “be a national but a federal
act. That it will be a federal and not a national act, as these
terms are understood by the objectors, the act of the people,
as forming so many independent states, not as forming one
aggregate nation.4

The argument that the Constitution was a “federal” act of the
people in the several states, and not the act of a single “aggregate”
people, had significant implications for the proper interpretation
of delegated powers. Citing the theories of treaty interpretation
presented in Emmerich De Vattel’s Law of Nations (1758),
Tucker explained that when a sovereign delegates away power in
a treaty or compact, they are presumed to have delegated away no
more power than is absolutely necessary. All such delegations of
sovereign authority, therefore, must be “strictly construed.”5
In other words, according to Madison and Tucker, the nature
and scope of constitutionally delegated federal power must be defined according to the nature of the Constitution, and the nature
of the Constitution is determined by the manner by which it came
into being. As a compact entered into by the sovereign peoples
of the several states, the delegations of power in that compact
must be narrowly construed on the presumption that the people in
the states would not have delegated away their own independent
existence. Any interpretation of delegated power which threatened to create a single “consolidated government” was
4. Id. at 146.
5. Id. at 151.

2020

SCHOLARSHIP IN REVIEW

123

presumptively incorrect given the interpretive mandate to preserve the remnant sovereign independence of the states.
Tucker’s rule of strict construction is a distinctly federalist
rule of construction. The rule comes into play whenever an expansive interpretation of federal power threatens the retained
powers and rights of the people in the several states. As Tucker
puts it, the Constitution “is to be construed strictly, in all cases
where the antecedent rights of a state may be drawn in question.”6
Such a rule might come into play, for example, if Congress tries
to grant a corporate charter (a common state practice), but it might
not come into play if the President tries to dismiss a member of
his cabinet without Congress’s approval. Similarly, the rule
might apply if Congress tries to regulate state soil for “internal
improvements,” but it might not apply if the President wants to
sign a treaty with France gaining soil for future states (the power
to make treaties with foreign nations being expressly denied to
the states). Finally, since the Constitution expressly prohibits the
states from using anything but gold and silver coil as legal tender,
determining whether Congress may issue paper money would not
trigger Tucker’s rule of strict construction.
Tucker’s “View of the Constitution” was the most influential
commentary on the Constitution published prior to Joseph Story’s
1833 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION. One of the reasons
for the influence of Tucker’s treatise was its scholarly articulation
of the theories of James Madison and the Democratic Republicans—the group who, in 1800, electorally vanquished the nationalist party that produced the Alien and Sedition Acts. It was the
Federalist Party’s sudden loss of political power that triggered
President Adams’s last-minute decision to elevate his Secretary
of State, John Marshall, to Chief Justice of the Supreme Court—
a kind of rearguard action to preserve his party’s nationalist theories of the Federal Constitution.
John Marshall was well aware of the constitutional theories
of his fellow Virginians James Madison and St. George Tucker.
Indeed, Marshall accepted the basis of their interpretive theory;
the proper rules of constitutional interpretation depended on the
nature of the document, and one determined that nature by
6. Id. (emphasis added).
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considering the document’s origins. This is why his opinion in
McCulloch first addresses constitutional origins before articulating interpretive principles.
It would have been politically scandalous to directly criticize
the work of James Madison and his influential “1800 Report on
the Virginia Resolutions,” and only slightly less scandalous to
publicly criticize the only broadly accepted constitutional treatise
in existence at that time, St. George Tucker’s “View of the Constitution.” Marshall therefore places the federalist compact theories of Madison and Tucker into the mouth of Maryland’s counsel. This allowed Marshall to both avoid scandal and avoid
having to address the fullest and best articulation of compact theory found in the works of the authors themselves.
Having feigned ignorance regarding Maryland’s reasons for
raising the issue of constitutional origins, Marshall then presents
his own “origins story”:
[The proposed Constitution] was submitted to the people.
They acted upon it in the only manner in which they can act
safely, effectively and wisely, on such a subject, by assembling in convention. It is true, they assembled in their several
states—and where else should they have assembled? . . .
[W]hen they act, they act in their states. But the measures
they adopt do not, on that account, cease to be the measures
of the people themselves, or become the measures of the state
governments . . . . The government proceeds directly from
the people; is “ordained and established,” in the name of the
people; . . . . The government of the Union then (whatever
may be the influence of this fact on the case), is, emphatically and truly, a government of the people. In form, and in
substance, it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by
them, and are to be exercised directly on them, and for their
benefit.7

By characterizing the adoption of the Constitution as an act
of the singular people of the United States (who just happen to
assemble in individual states), Marshall sought to avoid the interpretive implications of compact theory. Since the Constitution
did not emanate from the many sovereign peoples of the several
states, it need not be interpreted in a manner preserving the
7. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 403-05 (1819) (emphasis added).
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retained powers and rights of these independent sovereignties. Instead, the Constitution “emanates” from the national people and
the powers of the government created by the document must be
empowered to fully advance the needs and interests of the national people. After all, Marshall declares, the national government was a “government of all; its powers are delegated by all; it
represents all, and acts for all.” 8
Marshall’s opening gambit to reshape the story of our constitutional origins is the key to everything that follows in his opinion. Under compact theory, the federalist nature of the document
required that all delegated powers (whether express or implied)
be strictly construed. Under Marshall’s nationalist theory of the
Constitution, the nationalist nature of the document required a
rule of construction that effectuated its nationalist purpose. In
what is probably the greatest act of interpretive chutzpa in American history, Marshall claimed that the language of the Tenth
Amendment supports a nationalist interpretation of federal
power:
[T]here is no phrase in the instrument which, like the articles
of confederation, excludes incidental or implied powers; and
which requires that everything granted shall be expressly and
minutely described. Even the 10th amendment, which was
framed for the purpose of quieting the excessive jealousies
which had been excited, omits the word “expressly,” and declares only, that the powers “not delegated to the United
States, nor prohibited to the states, are reserved to the states
or to the people;” thus leaving the question, whether the particular power which may become the subject of contest, has
been delegated to the one government, or prohibited to the
other, to depend on a fair construction of the whole instrument.9

Putting aside the issue whether the people insisting upon and
the ratifying the Tenth Amendment believed they were just “quieting” their own “excessive jealousies,” Marshall’s emphasis on
what is omitted from the Tenth Amendment altogether ignores
what is in the Tenth Amendment—an inescapable declaration that
we have a federalist Constitution. In his “View of the
8. Id. at 405.
9. Id. at 406.
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Constitution,” Tucker pointed to both the language of the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments as jointly calling for a rule of strict construction.10 Marshall’s rule of nationalist construction dismisses
the significance of the Tenth and ignores the Ninth altogether.
In his book, Schwartz tries to persuade the reader that
McCulloch is not an “aggressively nationalist” opinion. When
viewed in the historical context in which it was first handed down,
however, it is clear that McCulloch was radically nationalist.
Marshall sought to displace (indeed, up-end) what had been the
dominant theory of the Constitution since the election of 1800,
and which was articulated in the deeply influential writings of
James Madison.
When McCulloch was handed down, Madison immediately
recognized Marshall’s effort to rewrite history and transform the
nature of the Federal Constitution. In his posthumously published
“Detached Memoranda,” Madison wrote that the “reasoning of
Supreme C[our]t [in McCulloch v. Maryland was] founded on erroneous views.”11 It was not that Madison objected to the Court
allowing Congress to charter a Bank—Madison himself had accepted that the “force of precedents” were in favor of the bank.12
Instead, it was the reasoning employed by Marshall in McCulloch
that Madison found “erroneous.” Madison singled out for particular criticism Marshall’s account of “the ratification of Const[itution],” and his claim that “the people” was a term “meant . . . collectively [and] not by States.”13
Madison was not alone in objecting to the reasoning in
McCulloch. As Schwartz points out, Marshall quickly found himself having to defend his opinion in Virginia newspapers. More
than a decade later, Marshall’s protégé, Joseph Story, was still
defending Marshall’s effort to bury the compact theory of the
Constitution. Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution (1833)
contains multiple passages expressly criticizing the dual sovereignty theories of St. George Tucker and James Madison, and

10. Tucker, supra note 2, at 151.
11. James Madison, Detached Memoranda, 1819?, in JAMES MADISON WRITINGS 745,
756 (Jack N. Rakove ed., Library of Am. 1999).
12. Id.
13. Id.
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emphasizing what Story viewed as Marshall’s persuasive nationalist reasoning in McCulloch v. Maryland.
By the time of the Civil War, however, northern Republicans
had come to embrace both John Marshall and James Madison.
Schwartz notes that Marshall and McCulloch enjoyed something
of a resurgence in the North during Reconstruction, with Republicans citing Marshall’s opinions as authority for an indissoluble
Union. What Schwartz does not mention, however, is that James
Madison and the Federalist Papers were held in (at least) equally
high regard by northern constitutionalists. Civil War and Reconstruction Republicans generally distinguished the constitutional
federalism of James Madison from the secessionist theories of
John C. Calhoun. Indeed, northern abolitionists embraced Madison’s “Virginia Resolution” and his “Report of 1800” as justifying state-level resistance to slavery.14 The man who drafted most
of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, John Bingham,
was especially committed to the ideals of Madisonian federalism
and limited construction of congressional power. Bingham, for
example, insisted that neither Section Two of the Thirteenth
Amendment nor any other delegated power could be properly
construed to authorize the 1866 Civil Rights Act.15 According to
Bingham, federal authority to pass civil rights legislation required
the addition of a new amendment. Bingham prevailed, and the
country got the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although John Marshall’s reverse-Tenth Amendment reading of national power ultimately became the darling of the New
Deal Court, Marshall’s account of our constitutional origins has
never been particularly convincing. When the Rehnquist Court
restored the idea of limited construction of federal power, it also
restored a more historically plausible account of the Constitution
as emanating from the still sovereign people of the several states.
True, the Constitution brought into being a national people
14. See In re Booth, 3 Wis. 157, 175-76 (1854); S.J. Res. 4, 12th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis.
1859), reprinted in 1 THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS: ESSENTIAL DOCUMENTS (Kurt
T. Lash ed.) (forthcoming June 2020).
15. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1291 (Mar. 9, 1866) (Speech of Honorable John Bingham, Of Ohio, on The Civil Rights Bill), reprinted in 2 THE RECONSTRUCTION
AMENDMENTS: ESSENTIAL DOCUMENTS (Kurt T. Lash ed., Univ. of Chi. Press) (forthcoming June 2020).
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(rendering secession unconstitutional), but in doing so it created
a system of dual sovereignty, a system preserved by the people in
1868 despite radical Republican efforts to erase American federalism.
Schwartz is entirely correct that, despite its mythological status, the nationalist possibilities of Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland have never been fully realized. Schwartz
blames this failure, in part at least, on Marshall’s sometimes ambiguous language. But equal blame must fall on Marshall’s effort
to spin a myth of his own—the myth of a fully nationalist Founding. One could, of course, argue that Madison and Tucker were
spinning myths when they described the Constitution as a dualfederalist compact. Nevertheless, in the case McCulloch v. Madison, it is Madison’s vision that informs the opinions of the modern Supreme Court.
Schwartz therefore is right to bury the myth of McCulloch.
But in doing so, we should recognize McCulloch for what it
was—a failed effort to bury the federalist interpretive theories of
James Madison and reinvent the nature and origins of the American Constitution.

